Why has the transformation of results been hindered for so long?

The difficulty in transforming scientific and technological achievements is not a problem unique to China, but it is particularly prominent in China. The results produced by a large number of universities and scientific research institutions are often limited to papers and patent registrations, making it difficult to form truly commercial products or processes. The reasons include insufficient technological maturity, poor market connection, and institutional obstacles.

The first is the orientation bias of the evaluation system. For a long time, the promotion and performance of scientific researchers have been closely related to the number of papers and journal levels, but have a weak connection to whether the results are actually implemented and whether they bring economic or social value. This incentive model of "emphasis on papers and light on transformation" makes scientific researchers tend to pursue academic indicators rather than industrial value in resource allocation and energy investment.

Secondly, the issue of ownership of technological achievements is often unclear. Since most scientific research projects are funded by the government, the ownership and disposal rights of results involve complex games between the state, units and individuals, resulting in unclear rights and responsibilities in the transformation process. For example, in some universities, although teachers are the ones who accomplished the results, the right to use technology needs to be approved at all levels, and they may even face the risk of accusations of "turning public ownership into private ownership", which makes scientific and technological personnel "want to transform but dare not touch it."

Is the institutional incentive mechanism aimed at "use" rather than "production"?

In the innovation chain, the output of results is only the starting point, and the real difficulty lies in its application and diffusion. Current institutional arrangements often focus on "output" in policy assessment, causing policymakers and scientific research implementers to focus on "short-term quantitative results" rather than "long-term practical value."

A survey of many universities across the country shows that the scientific researchers interviewed generally believe that the transformation of results is "high risk, uncertain returns, and cumbersome processes", and especially lacks tolerance for "failure". This actually reflects the system's lack of fault tolerance and support mechanisms for "transformation failure", and successful cases are highly dependent on policy windows or "brain-taking" decisions.

In the transformation chain, enterprises should be the main force in the "implementation" of technology, but many small and medium-sized enterprises report that it is not easy to gain access to university technology. On the one hand, the process of external cooperation between scientific research institutions is complicated; on the other hand, there is asymmetric game play in intellectual property negotiations and the lack of standardized achievement evaluation and pricing systems, resulting in high transaction costs.

In contrast, the Bayh–Dole Act in the United States clearly authorizes universities to own the property rights of federally funded scientific research results and allows them to transfer and license independently, which greatly improves the efficiency of transformation. This kind of institutional arrangement with clear property rights and adequate incentives is the most lacking link in our current system.

What obstacles exist in the achievement attribution and income distribution mechanism?

The unclear ownership of results directly makes it difficult for the transformation incentive mechanism to form a closed loop. Although in recent years policies have been continuously promoting the pilot program of “decentralizing the ownership or long-term use rights of job-related scientific and technological achievements”, such as the “Pilot Plan on Granting Ownership or Long-term Use Rights of Job-related Scientific and Technological Achievements” to scientific researchers, there are still many obstacles in the specific implementation.

On the one hand, universities and scientific research institutions are often reluctant to truly delegate power out of concerns about asset loss and liability. In actual operation, even if they are "empowered" in name, control rights are still taken back by setting approval procedures, consideration conditions, etc., and scientific researchers are still unable to independently lead the transformation process.

On the other hand, the income distribution mechanism lacks flexibility. Although the document stipulates that no less than 70% of the income from the transformation of results can be distributed to the achievers, most units still stay in the conservative mode, and the actual income received is far lower than expected, making it difficult to truly stimulate the enthusiasm of scientific researchers to participate in transformation.

Under such a mechanism, scientific researchers face two choices: one is to continue working "behind closed doors" and focus on scientific research and assessment; the other is to bypass the mechanism and simply "resign and start a business" to lead the transformation of results in a free capacity. As a result, a large number of achievements were lost outside the system, which in turn weakened the resource accumulation and continuous innovation capabilities of the public scientific research system.

Does the scientific research organization model support transformation needs?

In addition to institutional constraints, the current scientific research organization model itself is also difficult to adapt to the logic of achievement transformation. Universities and scientific research institutes generally organize research teams based on “disciplines” rather than “application scenarios” or “industrial issues”. This organizational structure is more efficient in the basic research stage, but it is not efficient in demand orientation, market connection, technology implementation and other aspects.

What’s more serious is that many research projects lack application prospect assessment and industry participation from the beginning. Project leaders are often not only technical leaders, but also need to play multiple roles such as administrative coordinators and business promoters, which is not the area where scientific researchers are good at. Transformation tasks are treated as “auxiliary responsibilities” and lack professional team support.

Comparing international experience, some universities in developed countries have established specialized technology transfer offices (TTO) to provide full-process services from achievement evaluation, intellectual property protection, market docking to negotiation and execution. This "intermediation and specialization" mechanism has significantly improved the transformation efficiency and reduced the non-academic burden of scientific researchers.

Why is local policy support often "hot but cold"?

In recent years, local governments have vigorously launched policies to support the transformation of scientific and technological achievements, established scientific and technological achievement transformation funds, and encouraged cooperation between universities and local enterprises. However, the actual results are often unsatisfactory. One reason is that policies tend to be "short-term" and "administrative".

Many places regard achievement transformation as a "performance project" with a short cycle and a desire for quick success. They prefer results that can quickly form visible indicators such as "implementation signing" and "project commencement". However, technologies that really have potential and are still in the "prototype verification" stage are excluded because of their "immaturity".

What is even more noteworthy is that policy implementation often lacks an in-depth understanding of the technology itself, which can easily lead to a policy life cycle of "hot start and cold end". Take the "Graphene Industrial Park" supported by a certain place as an example. It initially attracted a large number of scientific research projects and enterprise registrations, but three years later it was almost abandoned due to the lack of effective business models and sustainable application scenarios, becoming the epitome of the "results transformation bubble".

Do typical cases reveal structural dislocations?

Taking the high-end CNC system technology under the "Made in China 2025" strategic background as an example, a domestic scientific research institution has developed a servo control system with independent property rights, and its performance indicators have reached the advanced foreign level. However, the results failed to be successfully transformed within three years. On the one hand, this is because the system involves collaborative transformation with the existing industrial chain, and most companies lack the motivation to replace existing equipment; on the other hand, technology pricing is high and patent boundaries are blurry, causing companies to wait and see.

It was not until a provincial government took the lead in setting up a special fund and coordinated the docking of technical standards, supporting financial support and industrial policies through platform companies that the technology was truly promoted into large-scale application. This case just shows that the transformation of achievements is not "implementation as soon as the technology matures", but requires a multi-dimensional integration of systems, resources, and collaborative mechanisms.

Another typical case is the "flexible electronic skin" developed by the Tsinghua University team. Through in-depth cooperation with leading enterprises in Shenzhen, a joint laboratory was established between universities and enterprises. The enterprises were responsible for market demand analysis, and the universities were responsible for technological breakthroughs, ultimately forming industrialized products for wearable devices. This integrated structure of "industry, academia, research and application" is a typical model with high institutional adaptability.