The Illusion of Historical Mission under the Orthodox Concept

Liu Bei self-styled as "a member of the Han royal family," raised the banner of "restoring the Han dynasty" during the decline of the Eastern Han dynasty and the rise of various warlords. This move not only won him substantial support from the gentry but also endowed his regime with a natural aura of historical legitimacy. In an era that emphasized status, Liu Bei's concept of "reviving the Han dynasty" became an important political tool for him to consolidate Jingzhou and claim the throne in Sichuan.

However, this orthodox narrative, while inspiring, did not translate into actual governance capabilities. Liu Bei's regime remained fixated on the name of "acting on behalf of the Han," firmly opposing the usurpation of the Han by Cao Wei, and attempted to construct a moral critique of legitimacy against the Central Plains. The problem was that this concept limited the flexibility of Shu Han in adjusting to real political situations and also placed a heavy moral burden on it.

After Liu Bei ascended to the throne, his regime was pulled in two directions by morality and reality. On one hand, it had to continue the Confucian tradition of status, while on the other hand, it needed to establish an independent political entity. This role confusion created a gray area in institutional design. For example, in evaluating talent, loyalty and integrity were often prioritized over governance capabilities; in dealing with rival regimes, there was an emphasis on the dichotomy of good and evil, while real compromises were overlooked. While the orthodox concept united people's hearts, it also obscured awareness of institutional flaws.

Has "Knowing People and Using Them Well" Replaced Institutional Design?

The greatest advantage of Liu Bei's regime lay in his personal charisma and his style of "knowing people and using them well." From Guan Yu, Zhang Fei, and Zhao Yun to Zhuge Liang, Fa Zheng, and Pang Tong, Liu Bei built a highly loyal core military and political circle. This network of trust supported the stability of the early regime and created an image of unity within Shu Han.

However, this personnel mechanism was extremely reliant on personal judgment and emotional ties, lacking institutional guarantees. Once leadership changed, this model of governance became difficult to sustain. After Liu Bei's death, although Zhuge Liang succeeded in assisting the government, there were no figures with equivalent charisma afterward, and the political structure of Shu Han gradually fell into the predicament of "the death of the person leads to the cessation of governance."

Moreover, the "knowing people" logic of Shu Han's personnel management also easily led to irrational power distribution. For instance, Liu Bei's emotional appointments of old subordinates like Mi Zhu and Jian Yong, while loyal, lacked actual governance capabilities; trust in Pang Tong and Fa Zheng was also often based on personal feelings rather than institutional selection. In a regime with limited resources and isolated borders, imbalanced personnel management could quickly weaken overall effectiveness.

This system, which heavily relied on individual judgment, was prone to losing control during power transitions or sudden changes. Shu Han never established a sustainable and replicable talent selection system, making the issue of "no wise men after the virtuous prime minister" a significant manifestation of institutional dilemmas.

The Legal System's Fragility Behind "Valuing Virtue and Avoiding Punishment"

From the beginning, the Shu Han regime upheld Confucian morality, emphasizing "valuing virtue" and "benevolent governance." Especially during Zhuge Liang's administration, the political style leaned towards frugality and self-discipline, with law enforcement primarily based on persuasion and lenient regulations. However, while this moral governance concept could purify official conduct, it also risked rendering the legal system hollow.

For example, the moral self-encouragement in the "Memorial on the Expedition" stating "to dedicate oneself fully until death" is admirable but difficult to form a institutionalized accountability mechanism. In the bureaucratic system of Shu Han, officials' promotions were often based on virtue and reputation rather than performance and legal discipline. This "virtue-based governance with punishment as a supplement" model could function during times of small states and few people, but it easily exposed its institutional resilience when facing significant pressures such as war, rebellion, and financial crises.

More seriously, the Shu Han regime lacked a systematic legal code. Compared to the Cao Wei regime's implementation of codified laws and the "Wei Code," Shu Han had no clear legal system. Although Zhuge Liang advocated for "clear rewards and punishments," his basis was more on individual judgment rather than institutional norms. Once successors lacked political judgment, laws became ineffective, and discipline loosened.

The moral governance brought by idealism, while spiritually inspiring, could not replace the checks and balances and behavioral expectations provided by codified systems. This also made it impossible for Shu Han to respond to multiple challenges with institutional means as governance became more complex in its later years.

The Idealistic Obsession in Military Strategy

From Liu Bei to Zhuge Liang, Shu Han's foreign strategy consistently adhered to the overarching goal of "restoring the Han dynasty," focusing on northern expeditions to attack Cao Wei. This goal stemmed from political orthodox concepts and carried a strong sense of historical mission. However, the resource base and geographical position of Shu Han determined that it could hardly sustain a long-term offensive strategy.

Liu Bei's attack on Wu to avenge Guan Yu was reasonable, yet he overlooked the impact of the collapse of the Sun-Liu alliance on the strategic landscape, and the disastrous defeat at Yiling directly led to a decline in national strength. Although Zhuge Liang's six expeditions to Qishan and five northern campaigns had strategic deployments and partial successes, under the overall context of insufficient resources, tight troop numbers, and difficult supplies, it was challenging to achieve a strategic turnaround.

This strategy of "attacking the strong with the weak" long burdened Shu Han's finances, drained manpower, and weakened internal stability. In the later period, Jiang Wei's continuation of the northern expedition route further exhausted national strength, leading to domestic fatigue and public unrest, accelerating the regime's collapse.

Shu Han's military strategy was not lacking in wisdom but was overly driven by ideals, lacking a strategic realism perspective that adapted to local conditions and acted within its means. This stubborn faith in mission inspired people spiritually but posed a significant risk to resource allocation at the institutional level.

The Ongoing Fragility of Economic and Financial Systems

Located in the southwest, Shu Han faced rugged terrain and limited resources, with its land area and population far inferior to those of Wei and Wu. On this basis, without developing an effective financial system and resource mobilization mechanism, the state struggled to support regular military and administrative needs.

Historical records show that while Shu Han attempted to restore agriculture and stabilize the tax system, due to weak institutions and the significant power of local gentry, the central finances remained tight. Military expenditures remained high for a long time, with northern expeditions, border defense, and land reclamation projects exacerbating financial pressure.

Shu Han did not establish a mature land reclamation system like Cao Wei, nor did it systematically implement monopolistic economic measures such as state-run salt and iron. Local finances largely relied on fief income and temporary levies, lacking standardized budgets and regular guarantees. In the context of frequent wars in the later period, financial difficulties led to delayed official salaries and interrupted military supplies, significantly reducing governance capabilities.

The economic foundation determines the superstructure, and Shu Han's financial imbalance made it difficult for its idealistic political concepts to be realized materially, also rendering institutional reforms powerless, ultimately forming a paradox of "rich ideals but empty foundations" in governance.

Institutional Gaps in Succession Mechanisms

The political stability of Shu Han could be maintained during the periods of Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang, relying on the personal charm and organizational control of the founders. However, the lack of effective succession arrangements in the regime's design led to a rapid entry into a state of bureaucratic stagnation and power imbalance in later years.

When Liu Shan ascended the throne, he was still young and entrusted to Zhuge Liang, later experiencing several regents such as Jiang Wan, Fei Yi, and Dong Yun. However, these regent systems were often makeshift, lacking legal institutional guarantees, leading to frequent chaos in the actual power transfer process and undercurrents of conflict between regents and the royal family.

Although Jiang Wei inherited Zhuge Liang's ambition for northern expeditions, he lacked institutional constraints, gradually forming a trend of "military involvement in politics," which blurred the lines between military and political affairs. In the later period, Liu Shan was increasingly sidelined, the political trust system collapsed, and conflicts between court intrigues and military autocracy emerged, causing the already weak Shu Han to fall into institutional disorder and internal stagnation.

In contrast, although Cao Wei experienced the power grab by the Sima family, its imperial power system formed a certain balance with institutions like the Ministry of Personnel and the Three Dukes and Nine Ministers. Eastern Wu, despite frequent clan struggles, managed to maintain the operation of government affairs and the distribution of power. Shu Han, however, due to the lack of a succession mechanism, led to the idealism being unable to be passed down through generations, ultimately becoming a fantasy.