The Fragile Structure of the Cao Wei Political System and the Myth of "Strong Ministers Balancing Each Other"
When Cao Cao established the Wei state, he did not directly proclaim himself emperor, but instead founded the state under the title of "King of Wei," maintaining the nominal authority of the Han dynasty. This design of "acting on behalf of the Han without usurping" is essentially a compromise arrangement between power and legitimacy. However, this arrangement also buried hidden dangers for the later power structure.
During Cao Cao's reign, to prevent the restriction of imperial power, he adopted the system of "Minister of the Interior," strengthening centralization. He favored family members and trusted aides, establishing a governance system centered around the Ministry of Personnel and the Chancellor's Office, while implementing land reclamation, military discipline reform, and appointing capable individuals, quickly restoring order in the north.
The problem, however, is that this system, while appearing centralized, actually relied on a large number of strong ministers, forming a reality of "governing the country with ministers." Power was not institutionally decentralized, nor was there a legal mechanism for checks and balances. Once the emperor was young or incompetent, the powerful ministers could easily undermine imperial authority and dominate state affairs.
Although Cao Pi completed the transition of legitimacy after ascending the throne, he did not fundamentally reform the institutional risks of "powerful ministers restraining the emperor." When Cao Rui ascended the throne as a minor, power shifted to the regent represented by Sima Yi, effectively detaching power from imperial control. This design of the system could stabilize in the short term, but in the long term, it was prone to degeneration, paving the way for the Sima clan to "usurp power under the guise of regency."
Sima Yi's Political Layout and Power Logic
Sima Yi was known for his deep wisdom since the time of Cao Cao, serving under Cao Pi, Cao Rui, and Cao Fang across three generations. Among many powerful ministers, he was known for his caution and restraint, never showing off but steadily grasping real power. His political layout can be divided into three stages:
In the early stage, Sima Yi entered the core decision-making circle as a civil official, gradually establishing a loyal image; in the middle stage, he built military achievements during the pacification of Liaodong and suppression of Gongsun Yuan, gaining control of military power; in the later stage, he purged political rivals through the "Incident at Gaopingling," completely mastering the core of state affairs.
It is worth noting that Sima Yi's usurpation of Wei was not an overnight success, but a gradual advancement. Nominally, he always maintained the posture of "loyal minister assisting the state," feigning illness to avoid suspicion and outwardly showing submission, but in actual operations, he gradually laid out a power network. What he utilized was the Wei system's high dependence on regent ministers and the trend of weakened imperial authority.
His sons, Sima Shi and Sima Zhao, continued this strategy, dominating the succession of the throne through the "power of abolishing and establishing," ultimately completing the usurpation of Wei and ascending the throne during Sima Yan's time. This process reflects an extreme interpretation of a "power logic": in a system lacking institutional checks and balances, as long as powerful ministers control the military, bureaucracy, and the emperor, they can manipulate the fate of the state.
The Weakening of Cao Wei's Imperial Authority and the Manifestation of Systemic Dysfunction
As the power of the Sima clan gradually rose, Cao Wei's imperial authority appeared increasingly powerless. Especially after Cao Rui's death, the successor was young and lacked political experience, needing to rely heavily on regent ministers to handle state affairs. This "loss of voice" of imperial authority caused state affairs to completely fall into the hands of powerful ministers, forming a "strong outside but weak inside" facade of a puppet ruler.
After the Gaopingling coup, Sima Yi used the pretext of "clearing the emperor's side" to eliminate Cao Shuang, effectively completing the actual constraint on the emperor. Emperors like Cao Fang, Cao Mao, and Cao Huan were all puppets, unable to decide on major military and state affairs, and even daily administrative matters required approval from powerful ministers. Cao Mao once attempted to resist and govern personally, but was ultimately forced to death by Sima Zhao, marking the complete collapse of imperial authority.
Institutionally, Cao Wei did not establish an effective mechanism to safeguard imperial authority. Although the Ministry of Personnel was the central hub of governance, it was mostly controlled by powerful ministers; the Three Dukes system was virtually non-existent; the power of the aristocratic families grew increasingly in local areas but failed to provide a balancing force for central power. The entire national power structure tilted towards the powerful ministers, leading the emperor to become an institutional island.
This "systemic dysfunction" not only suppressed imperial authority but also made it difficult for loyal ministers to act. Individuals like Zhong Hui, Wang Ling, and Zhuge Dan, although loyal to the Wei dynasty, ultimately achieved nothing due to the lack of institutional support, and were even purged or utilized. The ultimate downfall of Cao Wei was more a necessary result of systemic collapse.
The Failure of the Heroic Governance Logic and the Bankruptcy of Ideals
The Three Kingdoms era is regarded as a time of heroes, with Cao Cao, Liu Bei, and Sun Quan all dominating the political landscape through personal charisma and cunning strategies. However, as the first generation of heroes passed away, the power succession entered the "post-hero" era. The problem is that while heroic politics can expand territories, it is difficult to construct a stable order at the institutional level.
Taking Cao Cao as an example, his ability to govern the country is beyond doubt, but he lacked systematic consideration for institutional construction. Although Wei had a certain legal foundation, it lacked long-term institutional design. After the heroes exited the stage, the power structure maintained by kinship, trust, and loyalty quickly collapsed, unable to support the operation of the regime.
Zhuge Liang implemented a clean government in Shu Han, which could stabilize the situation, but his model of leading by example could not be replicated; Sun Quan's employment of relatives and aristocrats in Eastern Wu also led to fragmented power. In this model of "heroic governance with absent institutions," once strong leadership is lacking, the political situation can easily become unbalanced.
The rise of the Sima clan is a satirical reflection of "the system surpassing the hero." They did not achieve invincibility like Cao Cao, nor did they dedicate themselves like Zhuge Liang, but they precisely exploited systemic loopholes and laid out a political network, ultimately taking over the regime established by the heroes. This change marks the end of the "heroic era" and the rise of "institutional politics."
Did the Establishment of the Jin Dynasty Achieve Systemic Reversal and Unification?
When Sima Yan usurped Wei and proclaimed himself emperor in 265 AD, establishing the Jin dynasty, it marked the completion of a "systematic power grab." This process was almost bloodless, quietly completed through institutional arrangements, power infiltration, and control of the throne. This "reversal-style unification" demonstrates a structural victory.
In the early Jin dynasty, a strategy of "loose externally and tight internally" was adopted, being lenient towards the aristocracy, granting fiefs to the royal family, and centralizing state affairs, which made the system appear stable on the surface. However, because the Jin dynasty inherited many loopholes from the Wei system, especially in the areas of royal family power decentralization and the power structure of aristocratic families, it led to the rapid outbreak of the Eight Kings' Rebellion, ultimately plunging into the turmoil of the Five Barbarians' chaos.
This also reflects a deep institutional paradox: although the Sima clan could use the system to concentrate power, they failed to truly transcend the old logic of heroic governance. Although the Jin dynasty had the name of "unification," it remained in a state of power fragmentation within the old system. The systemic reversal, while silencing the heroes, did not give birth to a truly new institutional order.
Historical Reflection Behind the Institutional Predicament
From the process of the Sima clan's usurpation of Wei, it is not difficult to find a long-standing dilemma in ancient Chinese political systems: individual heroes can initiate a situation but find it difficult to escape the constraints of systemic inertia; while the self-protective logic of the system often backfires on the achievements of heroes after their departure.
The systemic loopholes of Wei lay in the excessive strength of powerful ministers, the weakness of imperial authority, and the lack of institutional checks and balances. The failure of Shu Han reflects the gap between ideals and reality, while the problem of Eastern Wu lies in the close ties of the royal family and the fragmentation of aristocratic power. These three different political models, under the commonality of "lack of institutions," all struggle to escape the fate of destruction.
The rise of the Sima clan is not a simple version of "loyalty versus treachery," but a replacement of institutional logic with heroic logic. When power excessively relies on personal charisma and non-institutional loyalty, once succession becomes unbalanced, it can easily be replaced by forces within the system that are more adept at operation. This structural problem runs through the entire process of the replacement of Chinese feudal dynasties.
Ultimately, the question is not "did the hero fail," but "can the system surpass the hero?" The Sima clan's usurpation of Wei may only have revealed a corner of this deep paradox: heroes can establish a country, but only institutions can safeguard it; and if the system cannot be self-consistent, it will ultimately backfire on the heroes.